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Summary  findings
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role of agency  conflicts  between  fund managers  and  possible  to sidestep  the complexities  of forming  contracts
investors,  which are hard to resolve,  given the low power  and monitoring  institutions  to govern  fund managers.
of statistical  tests of performance.  In developing  countries  that seek  to use index funds in
Most of the empirical  evidence  about the superiority  of  pension  investment,  there are avenues  through which
index funds comes  from the United  States.  Shah and  policymakers  can make  index funds more viable.  In many
Fernandes  discuss  issues  associated  with the application  countries  there are significant  avenues  for improving
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issues  in the financial  sector that affect the enabling  mechanisms  used in the equity  market.
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iii1.  The idea of index funds!
In the decade of the  1960s and  1970s, many studies indicated that actively managed
funds - which seek to obtain excess returns by actively forecasting returns on individual stocks -
do  not  actually  obtain statistically significant excess returns.  This  was  consistent  with  the
hypothesis  of  'market  efficiency', which  suggested that  obtaining  excess  returns  should  be
difficult in a competitive market.
This research suggested a superior investment strategy: the index fund. This would be a
portfolio which passively replicated the returns of the index. The most useful kind of market
index is one where the weight attached to a stock is proportional to  its market capitalisation.
Index funds are easy to construct for this kind of index, since the index fund does not need to
trade in response to price fluctuations. Trading is only required in response to issuance of shares,
mergers, etc.
Table 1. The size of the indexation industry
It is safe  to suggest  that  many  smaller  index  fund  managers,  and  many  index  funds  outside  the  US,  were  missed  out
in this survey.  Hence,  the total  size seen  here is an underestimate,  and  the four-firm  concentration  ratio seen  here is
an overestimate.
Assets under indexation ($ billion)
US  US  Intnl.  Intnl.
Manager  Total  Equity  Bonds  Equity  Bonds
Barclays Global Investors  407  288  73  45  0.3
State Street Global  207  122  27  58  0.3
Bankers Trust  156  131  4  22  0.0
TIAA-CREF  96  84  0  12  0.0
Sum of above four  866  625  104  137  0.6
Total of 55 managers  1323  952  210  156  1.0
Four-firm concentration  65%  66%  50%  88%  60%
Source: A survey of index fund managers run by the magazine Pensions & Investments,
February 22, 1999.
The first index fund dates back to 1972. In the following years, the indexation industry
has grown at a dramatic pace. However, exact data about the size of the industry is hard to
obtain. Some evidence about the size of the index fund industry is summarised in Table 1. Index
funds are arguably one of the most successful ideas that have flowed from academic economics
into the real world.2
In an ideal world, where trading is frictionless and dividends are obtained by shareholders
on the exact ex-dividend date, the index fund would exactly replicate the returns on the index
(inclusive of dividends). A variety of events necessitate trading by the index fund: issuance of
shares by a company (which raises the weight of the company in the index), addition or deletion
of companies from the index, reinvestment of dividends, etc. In the real world, trading imposes
transactions costs upon the index fund, and dividends are not obtained exactly on the ex-date.
When a security trades at an "ideal" price of pA  purchasers end up paying a slightly
higher price Pb.  The percentage degradation faced here, 1  OO((pb/  p) -1), is called "market  impact
cost". Index maintainers make their calculations assuming that all trading is done at zero market
impact cost; index funds always suffer impact cost and thus generate inferior returns. Suppose
we have a time-series of returns on an index (inclusive of dividends) of rt, and the index fund
experiences a time-series of returns of rt'. Then the annualised standard deviation of rt - rt' is
termed "tracking error".
Tracking error summarises the extent to which the index fund is able to accurately track
the index. Index fund managers seek to minimise tracking error. From the viewpoint of an
investor, an index fund which experiences a large tracking error is a source of risk since it might
not replicate the returns on the index in the future.
2.  The rationale for index funds
Traditional fund managment has been based on the premise that the fund manager adds
value through his continuous efforts at improving risk-adjusted returns by forecasting returns.
Index funds are counter-intuitive in that they make no such effort. The index fund manager
makes no attempt at returns forecasting; his only goal is to replicate index returns. Why might
index funds be more attractive? The arguments can be summarised under two basic issues:
Market efficiency If markets are fairly efficient, then it would prove difficult for active
managers to obtain excess returns, after considering the higher fees and costs that they have to
run up.
Agency problems The principal-agent problem between investors and money managers
presents special difficulties owing to the unobservability of the fund managers ability and effort.
The relative ease with which the principal can monitor the fund management activities of
the agent, in the context of index funds, is one factor which underlies the growth of index funds.3
2.1  Does active management yield excess returns?
Table 2.  Costs and expenses of equity funds
This table shows a comparison between the expenses and transactions costs incurred by actively managed funds, as
compared with index funds.
Large  Cap  SmIC  Emerging
Large Cap  NoSmna  Cal  p  Market US  Equi  Non-uSt  US Equity  Equity
Commissions, Taxes  0.07  0.28  0.25 0.51
Bid/Offer, Market Impact  0.23  0.50  0.75 1.08
Total Trade Cost  0.30  0.78  1.00 1.59
Turnover
Active  150  150  150  150
Passive  8  10  50  20
Trade Cost
Active  0.45  1.17  1.50 2.39
Passive  0.02  0.08  0.50 0.32
Management / Custody fees
Active  0.45  0.55  0.75 1.20
Passive  0.05  0.20  0.08 0.55
Ongoing Costs
Active  0.90  1.72  2.25 3.59
Passive  0.07  0.28  0.58 0.87
Difference  0.83  1.44  1.67 2.72
Source: Cheung (1999).
Active management is an attempt to obtain excess returns. In doing this, active managers
have to expend resources on the enterprise of fund management, and have to incur transactions
costs in trading.4
Table 3.  The coefficient of the "Index fund" dummy in regressions which explain the expense
ratio
James  et al. (1999) have  a series of cross-sectional  regressions  exploring  the determinants  of the expense  ratio in the
Morningstar  database.
These regressions  control for the following  variables:  Assets, Squared assets, Average number of shareholders,
Assets per shareholder,  Assets in fund complex,  three-year  net return, three-year  gross return, three-year  standard
deviation,  dummies for five asset classes, a dummy  variable if the fund targets institutional  investors,  the initial
investment,  variables  expressing  loads and the 12bl fees  (in the US), turnover,  a dummy  variable  for advice  from a
bank, and fund age.
This table shows  the results for the coefficient  of the "Index fund" dummy  (measured in basis points) in these
regressions.
Coefficient  t-statistic
1992  -18.93  -1.69
1993  -32.45  -3.12
1994  -41.66  -5.3
1995  -34.16  -4.8
1996  -38.31  -5.8
1997  -39.47  -8.9
Source: James et al. (1999)
Index funds feature lower expenses by avoiding the expenditures into information
collection and information processing that is required in returns forecasting. Table 2 shows
evidence about the expenses and fees of index funds as compared with actively managed funds,
where index funds hold an advantage of 0.83 to 2.72 percent per year through lower expenses.
Table 3 summarises some empirical evidence from James et al. (1999), using linear regressions
which seek to explain the expense ratio of funds in the Morningstar database. After controlling
for a variety of factors which influence expenses, we see that index funds incur lower expenses
by around 30 to 40 basis points per year.
As a broad regularity, index funds tend to engage in smaller trading volumes as compared
with actively managed funds, which also helps enhance retums through lower costs of
transacting. Table 2 shows some US evidence about the transactions costs incurred by index
funds as compared with actively managed funds, where index funds hold an advantage of
between 0.43 to 2.07 percentage points per year through lower transactions costs.
We may note here that the large-cap stocks on the US stock market are amongst the
largest companies in the world. The situation in many developing countries may be closer to the5
evidence shown for the medium-cap and small-cap universes of the US stocks market.
In the fund industry, index funds are a highly contestable area owing to product
standardisation. If an active manager (for example, Warren Buffet) is highly successful, and
supports high fees, it is not clear how a competitor can offer a comparable competing product. In
contrast, if one index fund on a given index commands high fees, it is easy for entrants to offer
sharply comparable products and hence lead to a reduction in fees.
Low fees and expenses are not an end in themselves. The higher fees and expenses of
actively managed funds might be justified if markets were inefficient enough so that excess
returns were obtained, in excess of these fees and expenses. For example, the justification often
cited for paying higher management fees and transactions costs in small-cap, illiquid asset
classes is that the prospective returns are seen as being higher. Hence, the most important issue
in evaluating index funds is the ultimate returns delivered to the investor, net of fees and
expenses.
Table 4. A performance comparison: Evidence from the US over 1976-97
This  table summarises  the US experience  about  index  funds  as compared  with  actively  managed  funds.  Over  this 21-
year  period,  the S&P 500  index  outperformed  the S&P  500  index  fund  by 0.4%  per year,  and it outperformed  the
average  actively  managed  fund  by  1.1  % per year.
Product  Average  returns, 1976-97
Returns  on S&P  500  15.2%
Returns  on S&P  500 index  fund  14.8%
Return  on General  Equity  Funds  14.1%
Source: Figure 5 in Bogle (1998).
Table 5.  Mutual fimds which were outperformed by their respective indexes
In four major  asset  classes,  we see that  the predominant  outcome  was for the active  fund  to underperform  its
benchmark  index.  This  regularity  holds  for equities  invested  outside  the US and in developing  countries  also.
Category  Benchmark  Period  Fraction  of funds
Index  which  underperformed
General  equity  funds  Wilshire  5000 Index  1986-95  65%
International  equity  funds  MSCI-EAFE  Index  1986-95  73%
Emerging  markets  funds  MSCI-Emerging  Markets  1993-95  88%
Bond  funds  Lehman  Brothers  Bond  Index  1986-95  77%
Source: Lipper Analytical Services6
Table 6.  Performance of the median active manager when compared with indexes.
Performance  over  the five-year  period,  ending  on 31 December  1998,  of the median  active  manager  as compared
with  the market  index.  For example,  in  the universe  of emerging  market  equity,  the median  manager  lost 8.23%,
while  the index lost  8.7%,  so the median  manager  was  47 basis  points  ahead.
Category  Median
Manager  Index  Difference
U.S. Equity (S&P 500)  21.97  24.15  -2.18
U.S.  Smallcap  (Russell  2000)  15.20  11.86  3.34
Non-U.S.  Equity (MSCI  EAFE)  10.46  9.50  0.96
Emerging  Markets  (IFC  Composite)  -8.23  -8.70  0.47
Source: Frank  Russell,  cited in Cheung  (1999).
The historical experience with index funds as opposed to active managers is summarised
in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6. Table 4 shows that the index fund in the US lagged behind index
returns by 40 basis points; however actively managed funds lagged behind index returns by a
larger margin of 110 basis points. In Table 5, we see that in four major asset classes, the majority
of actively managed funds proved to lag behind their benchmark indexes. This includes two
categories outside the US: the classes of "'international equity" and "emerging markets"
investments.-
2.2  Agency problems
We can obtain important insights into the appeal of index funds by focusing on the
principal-agent relationship between the investor and the fund manager. How is the investor to
choose among competing fund managers? How is the agent to monitor the fund manager, and
ensure that the actions of the fund manager are in his best interest?
Fund management is a complex process, in which agency problems could surface at
many levels. There are many decisions where the fund manager could choose to act in ways
which are not in the best interest of the investor (Shah, 1999). For instance:
The fund manager could choose to buy stocks in which he has a personal interest.
Sometimes, fund managers allow the assets of the fund to be used by manipulative cartels, for
which they may receive private benefits.
The fund manager could "front-run" against the fund; buying stocks on his personal
account immediately before doing so on behalf of the fund.
The fund manager could choose trading mechanisms which yield superior private rents
instead of choosing the trading mechanism which yields the lowest transactions costs.7
The fund manager has choices about custodial and administrative services which might
not be made in a cost-minimising fashion.
It is difficult for an investor, or for a trustee, to closely monitor the fund manager and
ensure that these decisions are being made in his best interest. Hence, the prominent device
through which control can be exercised is by monitoring performance. The investor would select
fund managers who have exhibited the highest returns in the past, and fire fund managers who
fail to perform.
A naive comparison of returns across alternative funds is an inefficient way to measure
fund manager ability when there are differences in the levels of risk adopted by different funds.
The inherent randomness of market returns suggests that a casual comparison of returns should
give way to a formal statistical test in comparing fund managers. This leads us to the enterprise
of scientific performance evaluation efforts.
Mutual fund performance evaluation as yet suffers from many conceptual difficulties
(Roll, 1977). In addition, the statistical efficiency of existing performance evaluation procedures
is limited owing to the poor signal-to-noise ratio whereby genuine ability in fund management
tends to get drowned in the noise of market fluctuations. At page 735 of Bodie et al. (1989), we
see an example of a fund manager who has substantial skill - he adds returns of 0.2 percentage
points per month (i.e., is in excess of 2.4 percentage points per year). It turns out that if the
standard procedure of measuring the 'alpha' of the fund manager were employed using monthly
returns, we would need to observe the results of his fund managment for 32 years before we can
reject the null hypothesis of no ability (a=0) at a 95% level of significance.- This makes it
difficult for investors to identify and adequately monitor fund managers. We may note here that
this signal-to-noise ratio would be at its worst in developing countries, where stock market
returns tend to be more volatile.
This poor signal-to-noise ratio becomes a particularly contentious issue when anyone
other than an individual makes decisions about the choice of a fund manager for the individual.
Consider a situation where a pension fund committee selects an active fund manager:
This poor signal-to-noise ratio reduces the ability of the committee to identify the
manager with the best ability. When ability is relatively hard to measure, there is a greater role
for political lobbying in determining the choice of the manager. Alternatively, signals such as
pedigree, size or years of experience are often used as proxies for ability; this reduces the
contestability of the market for money management services.5
Once a manager is chosen, suppose the returns prove to be below the index at a future
date. The pension fund committee would then be relatively vulnerable to accusations of having
chosen the wrong fund manager. This factor also generates a bias towards hiring fund managers
who fare well on signals such as pedigree, size or years of experience, which helps the
committee to produce a plausible defence for their actions in the future, if the need arises.
The literature on performance evaluation has posed a significant challenge to the
proposition, held by all active managers, that the active manager is capable of adding value. In
similar fashion, there are legitimate concerns about the proposition, held by most sponsors, that
the plan sponsor is capable of selecting the active manager(s) who will add value in the future.8
These problems are an important motivation for the growth of index funds, particularly in
situations like pension investment. Comparing alternative index fund managers is relatively
straightforward - it essentially reduces to comparing the tracking error that they have produced.
It also makes it easier for individuals to obtain accountability from an institution such as a
pension committee: poor asset returns should be directly linked up to poor returns on the index.
3.  The mechanics of index funds
The stereotypical view of index funds is that their management is a trivial task. Yet, in
practice, there are significant challenges in the creation and operations of an index fund.
Unlike active managers, who make no promises about future returns, index funds promise
to replicate the returns of a publicly observable index. If the index rises by 20%, and if the index
fund reports 19% returns, then the investor is entitled to be suspicious about how a hundred basis
points of returns were lost. Index fund management is a challenge because of this level of
scrutiny and accountability.
3.1  Choice and construction of index
In many countries, 'widely prevalent' stock market indexes exist. In this case, the modern
development of the financial sector, in the direction of index funds or index derivatives, almost
automatically proceeds using these widely prevalent indexes. These market indexes often present
a host of awkward difficulties in modern applications.
In most cases, these market indexes were created years ago, in an environment with
limited information access, poor computation, and limited knowledge of financial economics. All
three factors are much altered today. Modern electronic stock exchanges, which use anonymous
trading with computerised order matching, offer a wealth of information about market liquidity.
The revolution in computational power at ever-lower prices has made it possible to embed
complex computational procedures into day to day index management. Finally, research into
index funds and index derivatives through the decade of the 1980s and 1990s has shed new light
upon the issues in index construction.
The difficulties with many traditional stock market indexes may be summarised as
follows:
When some stocks in the index are inadequately liquid, this contaminates the information
represented by the index, and makes it harder to use the index for financial products such as
index funds or index futures.
An illiquid stock contaminates the information content of the index via 'stale prices',
where the computation of the index at time t2 is forced to use information about a trade on an
illiquid stock at tl, t1 < t2.
Illiquid stocks make it difficult to trade the entire index as a portfolio, and significantly
hamper the viability of index funds and index derivatives. For example, it is fairly inconvenient
to undertake program trades for all 500 components of the S&P 500 index, and approximation of
the index using 150-300 stocks is a common procedure. Similarly, stock market indexes for9
developing countries created by agencies such as IFC are often highly impractical when it comes
to using them for index funds or index futures.
The procedures for 'managing' the stock market index often leave much to be desired.
The composition of an index should evolve over the years, reflecting changes in the economy,
and the procedures through which this takes place should be immune to special interests. Many
traditional index maintainers have proved to be weak on this count. In many countries, index
maintainers do not even produce a variant of the market index inclusive of dividends.
Every stock market index is a tradeoff between diversification and liquidity. Small
market indexes tend to be illiquid and under-diversified; large market indexes tend to be well-
diversified and illiquid. Yet, there are sharply diminishing returns to diversification. Most
randomly chosen portfolios in a country prove to be extremely highly correlated with each other,
as long as they are highly diversified. Hence, as long as adequate diversification is obtained, the
identity of specific stocks in the index is not too important as far as the risk/return character of
the index is concerned.
Table 7. Impact cost in portfolio trades for alternative stock market indexes in India
Average  impact  cost  (in  percent),  in 1997,  on India's  National  Stock  Exchange  (NSE),  for  doing  program  trades  for
alternative  stock  market  indexes.  The  NSE-50  index,  which  explicitly  factors  market  impact  cost  into  the index
construction,  proves  to have  significantly  lower  market  impact  cost.
Market  Cap.  Impact  Cost  (%)
(Rs.  Trillion)  at  trans.  size  (Rs.  Mln)
Index  5  10  20
BSE-30  1.96  0.35  0.46  0.67
Barings  India  Index  1.59  0.29  0.36  0.50
IFC  India  Index  2.62  0.53  0.65  0.89
MSCI  India  Index  2.67  0.53  0.64  0.87
NSE-50  2.21  0.29  0.36  0.49
Source:  Authores  calculations.
Hence, Shah & Thomas (1998) suggest that choosing highly liquid stocks, to forrn a well-
diversified index, could be a useful strategy. There are two aspects to market liquidity: market
impact cost (the degradation in price faced when placing a market order) and market resiliency
(the time taken for the market to revert to its original state after an order is placed). Measuring
and characterising market resiliency is, as yet, a unsolved research problem. However, on
electronic exchanges, market impact cost can be accurately measured. Shah & Thomas (1998)
use this in their method for index construction. Table 7, which is from their paper, summarises
the market impact cost in doing program trades on alternative indexes in India. The NSE-5010
index, where low market impact cost in doing index program trades is explicitly a goal, proves to
have substantially lower market impact cost as compared with alternative indexes.-
Stock market indexes which use methods such as these would be well suited for the
implementation of index funds and index derivatives. The reduced market impact cost when
doing program trades on the index lead to reduced tracking error for index funds.
Table 8. Trading costs on spot market for some market indexes
This  table  shows  the  transactions  costs  faced  in buying  index  baskets  for  some  altemative  market  indexes.  These
numbers  assume  that  the  basket  is traded  over  a maximum  of one  day.
Index  Basket  size  Commission  Market  impact  cost  Total
($ million)  (%)  (%)  (%/6)
US:  S&P  500  5  0.057  0.150  0.207
US:  S&P  500  futures  100  0.005  0.012  0.017
US:  S&P  Midcap  5  0.100  0.300  0.400
US:  Russell  2000  5  0.150  0.655  0.805
India:  NSE-50  5  0.200  0.250  0.450
India:  Nifty  Junior  2  0.200  0.800  1.000
Source:  US data  from  Exhibit  3 of Chiang  (1998)  and  page  756  of  Mason  et  al.
(1995);  Indian  data  from  author's  experiences  (1999).
Table 8 gives an international perspective on the transactions costs faced in doing
program trades on a given index. In each case, it is assumed that a series of trades are done
through one trading day, in order to buy the desired 'basket size'. In the US, the spot market
supports transactions of around $5 million with a total cost of 0.21%. When the index futures
market is used, the size of the basket rises to $100 million and the cost drops to one-twelfth of
this. The costs faced in obtaining baskets of less liquid stock market indexes, such as the S&P
Midcap or the Russell 2000, are much higher. In a developing country, India, the main stock
market index (NSE-50) supports much smaller basket sizes: around $5 million can be obtained in
a day at a market impact cost of 0.25%. The next tier of less liquid stocks in India, the Nifty
Junior index, faces a higher market impact cost of 0.8% for obtaining $2 million in a day.11
Table 9. Tracking error for synthetic index funds
This table compares the annualised tracking error obtained with a synthetic index fund, using three alternative
indexes for each country.
Annualised tracking error
Index  Local  FT/S&P  MSCI
TSE 35  2.92  5.26  5.58
Nikkei 225  3.06  7.14  8.20
Nikkei 300  2.61  2.97  2.92
TOPIX  2.94  3.14  4.24
Hang Seng  5.20  7.06  6.88
All Ords  3.11  3.52  4.25
STOXX 50  2.76  3.66  3.75
Euro STOXX 50  2.82  4.50  4.25
FTSE 100  2.25  2.54  2.50
CAC 40  1.59  3.47  2.80
DAX  1.17  3.54  4.39
SMI  1.10  2.06  2.51
AEX  1.30  4.70  6.34
IBEX 35  2.37  2.58  2.91
MIB 30  2.00  3.55  3.74
OMX  2.18  3.67  3.11
Source: Table 4 (page 5) from Goldman Sachs Equity Derivatives Research (1999).
Some related evidence on the importance of index construction is presented in Table 9,
which summarises the tracking error obtained by the "synthetic  index fund" strategy using
alternative indexes. In all countries, the local index yields a lower tracking error than the
FT/S&P indexes or the MSCI indexes. The reasons for this are not immediately apparent; it may
be because local indexes are more sensitive to local market liquidity. Regardless of the sources
of this difference in tracking error, this evidence underlines the importance of local indexes as a
vehicle for index funds and index futures.12
3.2 Methods of implementing index funds
At first glance, implementing an index fund appears straightforward: the index fund is
supposed to buy stocks with the correct weights, and trade in response to changes in the index set
or when any of the index stocks issue new capital. In practice, implementing index funds proves
to be a significant challenge, especially when the underlying stock market index has been poorly
designed. Liesching & Manchanda (1990) is a survey of these techniques.
The simplest method through which index funds are implemented is "full  replication",
where the portfolio held by the index fund is the same as the index. Such an index fund will
replicate the returns of the index, subject to the caveat of transactions costs in trading.
Many countries have market indexes with design flaws, and one of the commonest
problems is that of a market index which contains stocks which are highly illiquid. Sometimes, a
market index for a sector innately suffers from high transactions costs in trading when the entire
sector is only made up of illiquid stocks. When some or all index components are inadequately
liquid, index funds which use full replication can suffer from a large tracking error owing to the
large transactions costs faced in trading the entire index. One path for the implementation of an
index fund, in this situation, consists of holding a portfolio p' which is different from the index
portfolio p where: (a) the transactions costs associated with implementing p' are much lower than
those faced with the true index p, and (b) the correlation between p and p' is high. In general, the
portfolio p' should be chosen by explicitly solving a mathematical programming problem to
minimise the tracking error.7 If the liquidity of index components is sufficiently 'unbalanced',
where some components are disproportionately more liquid than others, such an index fund
might obtain a lower tracking error as compared with a fund which uses full replication.8
The third strategy for implementing an index fund is to utilise stock index futures.
Suppose an index futures product requires placing $x of collateral to support a position of $100.
Then it is possible to replicate the returns on an index portfolio worth $100 by adopting a long
position on the index futures market for $100, and investing the residual cash 1  00-x in riskless
government securities (Mason et al., 1995). This is called the "synthetic  index fund". In the US,
which has the most liquid index futures market in the world, the synthetic index fund has an
annualised tracking error of around 0.46% (Goldman Sachs Equity Derivatives Research, 1999).
In most markets, this yields slightly higher returns than the index for two reasons: (a) the
rate of return embedded in the index futures basis is slightly higher than the riskless rate of
return, owing to the credit risk of the futures clearing corporation, and (b) the residual cash 100 -
x is often invested in slightly risky securities, such as short-rated AAA corporate bonds, which
yields slightly higher returns.
3.3  Evaluating the alternative implementation strategies
Full replication is feasible when the liquidity of the stocks that make up the index
supports low-cost program trades on the complete index. The methods for index construction in
Shah & Thomas (1998) are oriented towards index funds implemented through full replication.
Full replication requires the least sophistication in terms of analytical and computational abilities
in the fund industry.13
When stock market indexes suffer from illiquid index components, optimisation-
strategies can be useful; however, they require considerable sophistication in terms of
quantitative finance.
When liquid index futures markets are available, synthetic index funds are often an
excellent option. In mature markets, the transactions costs faced when trading the index using the
index futures market can be as low as one-tenth to one-twentieth of the transactions costs faced
when trading shares on the spot market. Holding a position on index futures involves lower
custodial and administrative costs, especially in markets with primitive settlement systems where
physical share certificates are still in use. On the flip side, the index futures implementation will
forgo revenues from stocklending which the full replication fund enjoys.
Implementation through index futures is particularly attractive when the market index
suffers from disproportionately illiquid index components: the index futures market offers a
single, liquid, tradeable product. The user of the futures market would be relatively shielded
from the illiquid index components.
The weaknesses of this implementation strategy are two-fold:
*  The first problem is that index futures contracts expire, and the index fund would
need to re-establish this position on the next available contract, a process called
''rollover".  If an index fund has assets of $100 billion, it would need to execute trades
worth either $100 billion or $200 billion on the index futures market every few
months. This is in sharp contrast with an index fund which is implemented using full
replication: a fund with assets of $100 billion would typically undertake trading
volume of one to five billion dollars in a year.  Large index funds would suffer
considerable transactions costs when doing this rollover, for even the highly liquid
index futures markets are not adequately liquid to support such large transactions.
Hence, the largest of index funds have often been limited to full replication strategies.
There is an element of active management in the rollover process.  If a rollover can be
timed carefully for an instant in time when the near contract is expensive and a far
contract is cheap, then the rollover can actually yield excess returns. However, this
gives us an element of active management, and is inconsistent with the goals of index
funds.
*  Further, at the level of the economy, the index futures implementation has a basic
weakness since index futures are in "net  zero supply": for each buyer of a futures,
there has to be an equal and opposite seller. If we think of 50% of the GDP of a
country being invested in index funds using index futures, it will prove to be hard to
find sellers who would be at the opposite end of the trades (Rubinstein, 1989). If
index futures markets are used by index funds on this scale, we could observe
breakdowns in the market efficiency of the index futures market and enhanced
tracking error for these index funds.
In the real-world, all three implementation strategies have a useful role to play,
depending upon the situation. Ideally, if index construction is done soundly in a country, then
full replication should be the mainstream implementation strategy used by the bulk of indexed
assets. Index futures are often attractive for individual index fund products, but considerations of14
the economy as a whole (as in the context of the pension sector) relegate implementation
strategies using index futures to the margin, in efficiently coping with incremental assets moving
in or out of index funds. Optimisation-based strategies could be useful for extending the universe
of indexation beyond the most liquid assets, or when faced with badly designed market indexes.
4.  The enabling market infrastructure for index funds
The conventional analysis of index funds is generally based on treating the stock market
index and the equity market as a given, and analysing the usefulness and implementation of
index funds. For example, in the US, the S&P 500 as an index, and trading based on the
specialist' on the New York Stock Exchange as a market design, have existed for many decades;
research on index funds in this context has treated the S&P 500 and the NYSE as givens.
From a policy perspective, it is useful to view the question from a different perspective:
What is a market infrastructure which can best enable index funds? What aspects of the design of
the financial system can be modified in a way which helps the implementation and usefulness of
index funds?
4.1  Index
The most basic foundation of indexation is the stock market index. The treatment of
index construction, in Section 3. 1, suggests that there are significant gains to redesigning market
indexes using modem knowledge of financial economics, especially in countries with modem
market infrastructure in the form of electronic order-matching.
Unfortunately, market indexes which have existed for decades are hard to displace from
the public imagination. Even in a country with nearly 100% literacy, the poorly designed 'Dow
Jones' index plays an important role. Yet, in many developing countries, where existing market
indexes are not well respected, there are opportunities for successfully introducing a new index,
even today. Policy makers can play a role in this migration out of legacy indexes.
4.2  Electronic trading
Implementing index funds obviously relies on an exchange where orders are executed.
Prior to modem technology, a variety of market mechanisms have developed to address this
problem: these include the 'specialist' of the New York Stock Exchange, the 'dealers'  of
NASDAQ, the floor with 'open outcry' at the futures exchanges in Chicago, etc.
From the early 1970s onwards (Black, 1971), an important new idea has come to the
centre stage of market design, this is the idea of using a computer to match orders in a market
where economic agents anonymously post prices and quantities that they desire. This has also
been termed the 'open electronic limit order book' (OELOB) market. It has significant theoretical
appeal (Glosten, 1994), and is the dominant form of market organisation that has been employed
by exchanges worldwide in the decade of the 1990s. In recent years, the research community has
been able to obtain fresh insights into market liquidity on the OELOB market (Handa et al.,
1998).15
After a decade of debate and resistence, many traditional exchanges have moved from a
market design that was labour-intensive to the electronic exchange (for example, the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1997, and the London International Financial Futures Exchange
(LIFFE) in 1998).
In labour-intensive markets, a 'program trade' is difficult to execute, since human
reaction time has low mean and high variance. If an index containing 100 stocks has to be
purchased, it would require interacting with 1  00 (or more) humans. This is a complex and
expensive affair. Even today, on the NYSE, executing program trades for the S&P 500 takes
around two minutes; the index trader is exposed to the risk of market fluctuations within this
time interval. In contrast, electronic exchanges make it convenient and efficient to place program
trades. It is possible for an electronic exchange to execute 100 orders in a very short time, thus
reducing the tracking error that results from purchases that are spread over different index levels.
The open electronic limit order book market is particularly valuable for index funds since
it is transparent about prices and liquidity. An entire program trade can be priced before it is
placed.9 This is in sharp contrast with a traditional market such as the New York Stock
Exchange, where every program trade results in an unpredictable execution.
While the implementation of equity index funds, worldwide, has been greatly enabled by
the spread of electronic exchanges in the decade of 1  990s, most bond markets continue to use
primitive market institutions. This is a significant hurdle to the growth of bond index funds.
4.3  Call auctions
The "call auction" is a uniform price double auction where buyers and sellers compete in
offering buy and sell prices for a stated interval of time (Handa & Schwartz, 1996; Economides
& Schwartz, 1995). It is a trading procedure which aggregates the order flow over a period of
time to produce greater liquidity, and allows all buyers and sellers to obtain a single price (there
is no 'market impact cost' in the electronic call auction).
Three examples of the use of the call auction can be cited:
1.  The NYSE 'opening price' is obtained using (manual) call auctions on each of the
underlying stocks. This makes it convenient for program trading to take place at the
NYSE open. Market orders which are placed in the call auctions are guaranteed to
obtain the exact opening index level. For this reason, the S&P 500 futures settlement
price is derived from the NYSE opening price of the next day after trading on the
futures market has stopped.
2.  The Arizona Stock Exchange (http:  //www.  azx.  com)  is a stock exchange which
exclusively relies on electronic call auctions.
3.  In India, the National Stock Exchange (NSE) starts and ends the day using an
electronic call auction. This ensures that the opening and closing levels of the index
can be attained by index traders at zero impact cost.
To the extent that index funds are able to execute program trades at zero impact cost
using call auctions, it reduces the tracking error faced by them.16
4.4  Index futures
Index futures reduce the transactions costs of doing large index trades. As seen in Table
8, execution of basket trades for twenty times the basket size in the US takes place at one-twelfth
the cost. This clearly suggests that index futures have a major role to play in implementing index
funds. To the extent that a country has a functioning index futures market, it would assist index
funds in obtaining lower tracking error.
5.  Negative externalities of indexation
The worldwide growth of index funds in recent decades has raised concerns about the
externalities that this rise of indexation could impose upon the economy. These concerns are in
four areas: (a) distorted cost of capital for index stocks, (b) inferior corporate governance, (c)
diminished market efficiency, and (d) enhanced concentration in the fund industry.
5.1  Distorted prices of index stocks
Many observers have expressed concerns about index funds 'blindly' buying index
stocks. If $100 billion are in index funds on a given index, and if a stock enters the index with a
weightage of 0.5%, then index funds would be forced to buy $500 million of this stock.
Conversely, index funds would be forced to sell shares of companies that are dropped from the
index.
Could these activities significantly distort share prices? Do they result in elevated
valuations, and hence an unusually low cost of capital, for index stocks? Does the growth of
index funds thus contaminate the resource allocation produced by the stock market?
While these concerns may appear intuitively sound, they should be interpreted in the
context of the actions of the rest of the market. If index funds purchased $500 million of a given
stock, and if the price of the stock rose above a  fair valuation', then many informed speculators
would choose to sell that stock. If markets were efficient, we would see a reshuffling in the
ownership pattern of the company, with many shares going from informed speculators into index
funds; however in the ideal efficient market, the impact on prices should be 0.17
Table 10: Abnormal price fluctuations owing to inclusion/exclusion in the S&P 500 index
Evidence about abnormal stock price movements associated with addition or deletion from the S&P 500 index in the
US. The trading by index funds seeking to do full replication would have to be fully completed by the "effective
date".
(% change in stock price)
Addition  Deletion
From announcement date
to effective date  +3.8  -12.7
From effective date to
ten days after  -2.3  +6.2
Source: Lynch & Mendenhall (1997)
The event of addition or deletion of stocks from the S&P 500 index, with large index
funds in the background, has given researchers many opportunities to study these effects, starting
from the early work of Shleifer (1986) and Harris & Gurel (1986). The evidence, from Lynch &
Mendenhall (1997), is summarised in Table 10. When Standard & Poors announces that a stock
is added in the index, a future date where this announcement takes effect, called the "effective
date" is announced in advance. Index funds who seek to do full replication would be forced to
buy the stock by this date. From the announcement to this "effective date", an abnormal price
movement of +3.8% is observed; however 2.3% of this is lost in the following ten days. Hence,
the long-term price of inclusion in the S&P 500 is +1.5%. While this is a clear violation of
market efficiency, it appears fairly benign in terms of not constituting a large distortion of stock
prices or the cost of capital.
The evidence is less benign in the case of stocks which are dropped from the index: the
selling by index funds generates a temporary drop of 12.7%, of which 6.2% is regained in the
following ten days. The permanent drop in price amounts to 6.5%.
Hence, there is evidence that in a world with large indexed assets, the prices and hence
cost of capital of stocks is distorted depending on inclusion or exclusion from the index.
However, these effects do not appear to be very large.
5.2  Inferior corporate governance
Some observers have criticised index funds on the grounds that index fund managers do
not take interest in resolving the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Index
funds are viewed as free-riders on the corporate governance problem that other agents in the
other economy are expending resources upon.18
This free-rider problem is present with any investor who chooses to ignore corporate
governance issues. The very logic of the limited liability company is that it gives shareholders
the right, and not the obligation, to vote.
We can view failures of corporate governance as a violation of market efficiency. If a
firm is producing inferior cashflows owing to improper incentives for managers, then there is an
opportunity for an active portfolio manager to seize control of the company, modify the activities
of the company so as to attain higher cashflows, and benefit from these activities to the extent
that the share price of the company goes up. The existence of these situations, and the
importance of speculators who engage in such activities, is undeniable.
5.3  Diminished market efficiency
Index funds are criticised for not engaging in stock speculation, in making forecasts about
future returns, buying 'undervalued' stocks and vice versa. If, in principle, the entire economy
shifted to index funds, then market efficiency would undoubtedly deteriorate drastically. This is
somewhat related to the previous issue; if the entire economy shifted to index funds, agency
problems would be exacerbated.
It is useful to view index funds as the product of an equilibrium. In a world where
numerous economic agents compete for speculative profits, a state approaching market
efficiency is obtained. Index funds are useful in this state. The appeal of index funds is closely
related to the extent to which competition between speculators makes it difficult to obtain excess
returns from active management.
If, in a country, there were "too  few" speculators and "too  many" index investors, then
the rates of return in active management would significantly exceed those obtained through
indexation. As of yet, we have probably not encountered this situation in any country.
5.4  Concentration in the fund industry
Earlier, in Section 2.2, we commented on the role of signals such as pedigree, size and
years of experience as proxies for fund management ability, in a world where it is difficult to
identify genuine ability. This serves to reduce the contestability of the money management
industry.
While this problem is an important motivation for index funds, insofar as index funds
lend themselves to easier monitoring of the actions of fund managers, the pressures towards
concentration of the fund industry are even more acute with index funds. The basic problem
faced here is that index fund management itself is a fixed cost activity. Once computer systems
are setup for managing a small index fund, the same systems scale up to much larger assets. The
costs of sales and distribution costs also prove to be lower, per unit of assets, for larger funds.
This phenomenon has led to remarkably low fees for large investors: in the US market,
fees of 0.01% per year are known to be prevalent for assets of $1 billion. However, this
phenomenon serves to throw up entry barriers against a new firm that seeks to manage index
funds. Hence we see a pronounced concentration in the index fund industry, with four-firm
concentration ratios in excess of 60% (see Table 1). Each basis point of fees on a billion dollars19
of assets is a revenue of $10 million. The major indexers seen in this table probably earn
significant monopoly rents.
This is one negative consequence of the rise of index funds. Active management, in
contrast, does not suffer from increasing returns to scale to this extent. On the contrary, many
active managers view the management of large assets as being an important handicap which
makes it difficult for them to obtain excess returns. There is empirical evidence suggesting that
the "optimal" size for a growth fund in the US is around $1.5 billion, the "optimal" size for a
value fund in the US is around $500 million and the "optimal" size for a blend fund in the US is
around $2 billion (Indro et al., 1999). These modest sizes are in sharp contrast with the index
fund industry, where extremely large funds dominate.
6.  Index funds in developing countries
In the cohtext of a developing country, the four central questions concerning index funds
are:
*  Are index funds relevant in developing countries, given the prevalence of inferior
market efficiency?
- Are the benefits of index funds inaccessible in developing countries owing to the
greater tracking error that is faced owing to illiquid stock markets?
*  What implementation strategies should be adopted for index funds in developing
countries?
*  What can developing countries do in order to better benefit from the supply of risk
capital through index funds?
6.1  Are index funds relevant?
Most studies on the returns from active management use data for OECD countries. While
accurate measures of the size of the indexation industry do not exist, the available evidence
suggests that 88% of existing indexed assets are located in the US alone. To what extent do the
arguments and evidence about index funds - that are well-established in OECD countries -scale
to developing countries?
Research in recent years supports the idea that there are significant differences in the
character of price processes in emerging countries as compared with those seen in OECD
countries. Emerging markets are considered to have higher volatility, higher long-term returns,
higher transactions costs, and greater predictability (Bekaert et al., 1998). If market efficiency in
developing countries is systematically inferior, then there may be greater opportunities for active
managers to add value in the fund management process. Hence, the case for indexation may not
readily scale from OECD countries to emerging markets.20
6.1.1  Theoretical arguments
At a basic level, there are three aspects, where developing countries differ from OECD
countries, which could lead to inferior market efficiency:
Information access  Inferior disclosure laws, and an ill-developed information
business,imply that information access in developing countries is inferior.
Human capital Inferior human capital may imply there are fewer economic agents who
can arbitrage away mistakes in observed prices.
Transactions costs Market mechanisms in developing countries often impose high
transactions costs, so that what appears to be a breakdown of market efficiency at a statistical
level is actually not a profit opportunity. To the extent that inefficiencies are not exploitable, net
of transactions costs, market efficiency holds, in an economic sense. The efficient markets
hypothesis is only a statement about the absence of arbitrage opportunities in an economy
populated by rational, profit-maximising agents. To quote Jensen (1978), "an  efficient market is
defined with respect to an information set Ft if it is impossible to earn economic profits by
trading on the basis of Ft."
If these three factors are at work in producing inferior market efficiency in developing
countries, it does not necessarily imply that active management is a superior alternative. If
information access is poor, then active managers would similarly suffer from the lack of
information. The inadequacy of skills in the financial sector in a country would equally apply to
firms which seek to do active management, as they apply to individuals engaging in stock
speculation. It is not clear that active managers would somehow be able to tap into superior
human capital. Finally, if market inefficiencies exist owing to high transactions costs, these
inefficiencies are not profit opportunities for active managers.
Section 2.2 showed an important motivation for indexation: the agency problems between
investors and fund managers. These problems are present to a greater extent in developing
countries, where institutional development is inferior, and law enforcement in the financial sector
is highly limited. This is a particularly important motivation for indexation in developing
countries where the institution of the corporation, and the mechanisms for overcoming principal-
agent problems between investors and fund managers, are ill-developed.
When a pension committee has to make decisions on behalf of workers, in developing
countries, the risk of a poor decision by the pension committee owing to ethics lapses is acute,
and indexation is correspondingly attractive even if the index is not ex-ante mean variance
efficient.
6.1.2  Empirical evidence
If the above arguments are sound, then the empirical evidence should favour index funds
in developing countries also. Empirical testing in this area suffers from several constraints,
notably the lack of a well defined "emerging markets benchmark", and the short time-series.
The evidence in Table 5 suggests that 73% of equity funds that invest outside the US21
underperform a benchmark index, and 88% of funds which invest in 'emerging markets'
underperform the index. These fractions are not particularly different from those seen with index
funds in OECD countries.
Table 11.  The value added by active management
This  table summarises  the evidence  of Muralidhar  & Weary  (1998)  on the performance  of active  managers  in
various  asset classes.  For each  asset  class, it reports  the average  extent  to which  fund  managers  outperformed  the
benchmark  (net  of fees),  the tracking  error  with  respect  to the benchmark,  and  the average  information  ratio
(annualised  excess  return  divided  by tracking  error).  For  categories  marked  with  a *, the evidence  pertains  to five
years (12/92  to 12/97);  for other  categories  it pertains  to a ten year  period  (12/87  to 12/97).
Perfonnance  of active  managers  Benchmark
Asset  Class  Returns  Tracking  error  Information  ratio  Index
US Large  Cap  0.42%  4.8%  0.0  S&P  500
US Mid Cap  +0.91%  6.9%  0.3  S&P  Midcap
US Small  Cap  *  +2.94%  8.9%  0.4  Russell  2000
Non-US  Eq.  *  +4.00%  10.5%  0.4  MSCI  EAFE
Non-US  Eq. *  -0.15%  6.5%  0.0  EAFE  - Lite
Emerging  Mkts  Eq.  *  +1.90%  8.4%  0.3  MSCI  EMG  Free
Source: Muralidhar  & Weary  (1998)
These results, from Table 5, should be interpreted with caution since the data series only
runs from 1993 to 1995. In a recent working paper, Muralidhar & Weary (1998) summarise the
evidence on active management in various asset classes. Their results are summarised in Table
11. For example, for the US Large Cap sector, they find that the average manager underperforms
by 42 basis points, net of fees, and imposes a tracking error of 4.8% on the investor.
For non-US equity, we see significant value added by active managers when the MSCI
EAFE index is used. However, if the "EAFE - Lite" index is used (which attaches a lower
weight to Japan), the excess returns vanish.
For emerging markets equity, Muralidhar & Weary (1998) have evidence over a
somewhat longer period, from 1992 to 1997. Using the MSCI EMG Free index, they find that
active managers add value to the extent of 190 basis points per year, at the price of a tracking
error of 8.4%. However, this evidence does not necessarily imply that active management is a
superior strategy in emerging markets, for the following reasons:
As Muralidhar & Weary (1998) point out, all their evidence is somewhat biased in favour
of active management owing to the selection bias, where the funds who survive for the full span
are likely to be the funds with better returns. They describe empirical evidence which suggests
that correcting for this selection bias reduces the apparent returns of fund managers in the EAFE22
universe by 170 basis points per year.
The MSCI EMG Free index is not well established as a sound benchmark covering the
emerging markets universe (for example, see Masters (1998)).
From a sponsors point of view, the tracking error is also an important concern. When a
sponsor hires an active manager in this universe, the one-year returns (relative to the benchmark)
could lie between -14.6% and +18.4%. This poses significant risks for the sponsor.
The average excess return seen here is a mean of a small sample of 33 fund managers. In
an environment with high background noise (the weaknesses of the MSCI EMG Free index, and
the high tracking error), the statistical precision of this average could be limited.
This environment, with a high tracking error, makes it difficult to select an active fund
manager, and exposes the sponsor to the agency conflicts discussed in Section 2.2. In this sense,
the ex-post average excess returns of fund managers in this asset class are not easily identifiable
in an ex-ante sense.
Jarnes et al. (1999) have a set of regression equations where the net return of funds
investing in various asset classes are explained by a variety of explanatory variables. The
explanatory variables used here are: assets, squared assets, number of shareholders, assets in
fund complex, three-year standard deviation of returns, a dummy variable if targeted at
institutional investors, the size of the initial investment, variables about loads and 12bl  fees (in
the US), turnover, a dummy variable for "bank advised", the age of the fund, and a dummy
variable if it is an index fund. The dataset used here is drawn from the Morningstar database.
Table 12.  The coefficient of the "index fund" dummy in cross-sectional regressions
explaining fund returns
Janes et al. (1999)  have  a set of cross-sectional  regression  equations  explaining  the returns  of funds,  by asset class.
This table shows  the coefficient  of the dummy  variable  "Index fund"  in these  models.
Us
Large cap Small cap  Intnl.  EMktsrging
Coefficient of "Index"  +2.61  -1.27  -3.57  -3.72
t-statistic  4.26  -0.45  -1.29  -0.39
Number  of funds  580  218  480  96
Adjusted R 2 16.94  11.04  8.79  30.34
Source: James et al. (1999)23
Table 12 summarises the evidence that these regressions offer on the "Index fund"
dummy variable, after controlling for all the other variables described above. This shows
negative coefficients in three sectors: US small caps, International, and Emerging markets.
However, none of these coefficients are statistically significant.
These results are somewhat biased against index funds insofar as the dataset suffers from
selection bias. However, the numerical results do suggest that the null hypothesis - that the
average returns from index funds are similar to the average returns from active management -
cannot be rejected. This is in contrast with the US Large Cap asset class where this hypothesis
can be conclusively rejected in favour of the idea that index funds yield higher retums.
6.2  Are index funds feasible?
Some observers have expressed concerns that the inferior stock market liquidity, and the
weaknesses of stock market indexes, in developing countries will lead to significant tracking
error in index funds.
The evidence in Table 8 suggests that program trading on some stock market indexes in
developing countries is feasible; though the basket size which can be obtained in a day is
obviously much smaller than that seen in the US. Index funds in developing countries are likely
to be formed of much smaller assets than those seen in the US, hence this is not a key constraint.
In India, IDBI Mutual has an index fund on the NSE-50 index, which has an annualised tracking
effor of 0.35%.r°
6.3  How should index funds be implemented?
Developing countries are characterised by significant concerns about stock market
liquidity, low skills in modern financial economics, and ill developed derivatives markets.
The concerns about stock market liquidity would emphasise caution in terms of being
able to execute program trades on the index basket. In developing countries, it is not safe to
make assumptions about reliably trading even the stocks in the largest quartile. For example, the
IFC India index, which is not conscious about market impact cost in program trades, suffers from
a market impact cost which is 82% worse than that of the NSE-50 index, when doing program
trades of Rs.20 million.
The weakness in skills in modern financial economics suggests that optimisation-based
procedures may be hard to implement. Even if skills and software were to be transplanted from
external sources, the factor models that are required for these optimisation-based procedures are
typically based on the research literature going over decades. Such knowledge is typically not
available in the literature in a developing country.
The weakness in index derivatives suggests that index derivatives would not play an
important role in implementing index funds.
Hence, the simplest situation is one where an index fund is implemented using full
replication, and the index is free of stocks which are disproportionately illiquid. The methods of
Shah & Thomas (1998), described in Section 3.1, are designed to produce an index which suits24
these needs.
For countries  which  already  have  index  derivatives,  index  funds  which  use full
replication  can greatly  benefit,  on the margin,  from using  a liquid index  futures  market.  Index
options  can be used to construct  a variety  of guaranteed  return  products  (Mariathasan,  1997).
In each  country,  a research  program  on models  of asset  pricing  would  create  the
knowledge  and understanding  of factor  models  which  would  lead to optimisation-based
procedures  in the future.
6.4  What can policy makers  do to enable  index  funds?
The primary  role that policy  makers  can play,  in enabling  index funds,  is in terms of
building  the institutional  infrastructure  which  helps  index funds.  This runs over  the issues of
index  construction,  electronic  trading,  program  trading,  call auctions,  and index  futures  that are
discussed  in Section  4. From the viewpoint  of pension  reforms,  to the extent  that equity
investment  by pension  funds is channeled  through  index  funds,  it would  generate  greater
development  of human  capital  in this area,  and generate  a constituency  for the reforms  which
would  lead to this market  infrastructure.
7.  Pension  investment  in equities
In this section,  we link up the ideas  presented  above  more directly  into the questions  and
concerns  of pension  investments.
7.1  Harnessing the equity premium
The basic  motivation  for equity  investment  by pension  funds  is based  on the 'equity
premium',  the excess expected  returns  that is offered  by the equity  market  (Siegel, 1998).  On
seventy-year  horizons,  for which  stock  market  indexes  are observed  in OECD  countries,  the real
rate of return on the equity  index  is around  five to six percentage  points in excess  of the real rate
of return  on fixed income  investments.  The existence  of the equity  premium  is consistent  with
economic  theory  - where investors  who  bear  the risk of non-diversifiable  fluctuations  should  be
compensated  with a premium  in the form of higher  expected  returns -however  the size of the
premium  seems  to be difficult  to explain  (Siegel  & Thaler, 1997;  Mehra  & Prescott, 1985).
The equity  premium  provides  a powerful  justification  for pension  investment  using
equities,  particularly  when considering  the long  time horizons  faced  in pension  investment.  Over
a thirty-year  horizon,  investing  at 1% in real terms  (a typical  fixed-income  asset)  yields a return
of 35%  while investing  at 6% in real  terms (a typical  stock  market  index)  yields a return of
474%.
The empirical  evidence  about  the equity  premium  is entirely  based  on the growth  of stock
market  indexes  observed  over past decades.  Hence,  investment  in the equity index  is a direct
method  of translating  this evidence  into an investment  strategy.  The viability  of index  funds, and
their ability  to operate  at fairly low levels  of tracking  error,  suggests  that this is indeed  a feasible
investment  strategy.25
7.2  The "active management premium"
More generally, we could ask the question: can an actively managed fund result in the
core equity premium (the returns to the index) and an additional "active management premium"?
The empirical evidence (Table 4 and 5) seems to suggest that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the "active management premium" is zero.
The issues discussed in Section 2.2 are particularly important in the context of pension
investment, and serve as a motivation for favouring index funds even if the "active  management
premium" was positive.
7.3  Sophistication of workers
In individual-centric programs, most workers are not sophisticated in understanding
performance evaluation of money managers. They are ill-equipped to consume the results of
performance evaluation and hire the fund manager with the best ability.
7.4  Three-layered agency problems
If a layer of intermediaries - in the form of a pension committee - is introduced, then we
would have a two-tiered agency conflict, where workers would need to devise institutional
mechanisms to encourage committee members and fund managers to work in the best interests of
workers. Devising incentive-compatible arrangements  in this situation is not easy.
In either scenario, index funds offer a way to sidestep these problems by offering clear
accountability, while staying in tune with the basic goal of pension investment in equities, which
is to harness the equity premium.
7.5  Political risk of investments in equities
Many observers have commented on the quasi-nationalisation that might be implicit in
large-scale pension investments in equities. It is easy to imagine that 50% of the GDP of many
countries could be invested in equities. In this case, there is a political risk where government
could use this control for political ends. This is particularly important in countries which do not
use individual accounts or give workers a choice of the fund manager.
By limiting the discretion with fund managers, index funds are a way to reduce this
political risk. If pension investments exclusively took place through index funds, then fund
managers would have very little discretion about how they would pick stocks.
8.  Conclusion
In conclusion, index funds are an important investment strategy for investors who seek to
harness the equity premium. The case for index funds has often been phrased in terms of market
efficiency, and the observed inability of active managers to outperform the index over long
periods of time. In addition, the agency conflicts between investors and fund managers are also
an important motivation for index funds, which benefit from simple and unambiguous
accountability.26
The equity premium gives us a powerful motivation for equity investment by pension
funds. In this context, index funds make it possible to sidestep the complexities of forming
contracts and monitoring institutions to govern fund managers.
In developing countries which seek to use index funds in pension investment, there are
avenues through which policy makers can improve the viability of index funds. The issues faced
here are primarily those of market mechanisms used on the equity market, and the construction
of the market index. In many countries, there are significant avenues for improvement in these
areas, which will benefit market efficiency at large, and the viability of index funds in particular.27
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3 The concept of an "emerging market index" appears to have many difficulties as of yet
(Masters. 1998). Related evidence, for a comparable five-year period, is shown in Table 6.
There are fewer conceptual difficulties faced with a stock market index pertaining to one
country. Many countries have yet to embark upon large-scale international diversification as a
part of their pension reforms. The local stock market index is obviously best suited to purely
domestic performance appraisal.
However, much of the empirical evidence about the performance of active managers (for
example, Table 11 ahead) is derived from internationally diversified money managers. We
should utilise this empirical evidence - however imperfect - while applying care in interpretation.
4 A similar argument is found in Ambarish & Siegel (1996).
5 There is empirical evidence which suggests that active managers produce inferior returns when
assets under management cross a certain threshold (Indro et al., 1999). Hence, if size is used as a
signal of ability, and a sponsor is biased towards selecting the largest of funds, then this could
introduce a bias towards inferior performance.
6 The ongoing management of the NSE-50 index set may be summarised as the following rules:
Every stock outside the index is screened for liquidity as follows. In a scenario where it
was indeed the 51  st stock in the index, program trades are simulated for buying Rs.5 million of
this hypothetical index. The market impact cost faced on this stock is measured. If impact cost is
below 1.5% with a 90% probability, over the last six months, the stock is considered eligible.
A stock inside the index set is deleted from the index when it fails this same test: when
the impact cost on this stock (in doing index program trades worth Rs.5 million over the last six
months) exceeds 1.5% with a probability of 10% or more. The largest available eligible stock is
used as a substitute.
An eligible stock from outside the index displaces the smallest stock inside the index,
even if the smallest incumbent stock is adequately liquid, if the incoming stock is more than
thrice the size of the smallest incumbent stock.31
These  rules are applied  every  three months  to govern index  set changes.
' Liu et al. (1998)  offer an exposition  of this procedure.  Blin  (1997)  is an example  of applying
factor models  to solving  this problem,  of finding  a ten-stock  portfolio  which is maximally
correlated  with India's  NSE-50  index. Harrison  (1991)  is an example  of applying  this to
obtaining  an index fund in New Zealand.
8 There is relatively  little research  on tracking  error.  Part of the problem  here is that accurate
measurement  of transactions  costs,  with the market  mechanisms  prevalent  in the US, is difficult.
For example,  Larsen  & Resnick  (1998)  discuss  tracking  error obtained  through  optimisation,  but
assume  that there are no transactions  costs.
9  For example,  at http://www.utisel.com/livefeed,  the market  impact  cost for doing  index trades
in India is displayed  in realtime.  It is calculated  off the limit order  book, which  is publicly  visible
on India's  National  Stock  Exchange  (NSE),  an electronic  exchange.
10  Nayak  (1997)  documents  an experience  of the first index  fund running  out of India,  on the
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